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What factors facilitate or undermine peaceful resolution of conflicts? 
Scholars have for centuries offered chronicles and explanations of individual 
conflicts, but a comprehensive, integrated theory of why some conflicts are resolved 
peacefully while others break out in violence remains elusive. ' Samuel Huntington 
pointed in the direction of a partial theory when he suggested that "political decay" 
results when social mobilization increases faster than political institutions, particularly 
political parties and party systems.2 Political institutions provide the procedural and 
temporal space in which (presumably) rational political actors can discover their 
shared interests in peaceful conflict resolution and establish enduring trust and 
alliances to reach these goals. Institutions help reconcile the gap between individual 
and collective interests.3 
This article offers a concrete example of this institutional approach by 
examining China's Tiananmen Square tragedy in 1989.4 This event received unique 
global publicity but in fact was not unusual. There have been dozens of similar 
instances of protest and repression in recent decades, including those in Thailand 
(1992), Madagascar and Mali (1991), Algeria and Burma (1988), Philippines 
(1986), Tunisia and Morocco (1984), and Korea (1980). A case study of this event 
in China can contribute to the building of theory with broad utility. 
The Tiananmen explosion had its roots in the rapid social mobilization of the 
1980s as China's leaders undertook significant economic, social, and cultural 
reforms and increased China's international, cultural and economic linkages. 
Students were exposed to Western values and demanded personal freedoms and 
democracy. Market reforms brought inflation, unemployment, wealth, poverty, 
and new opportunities for corruption. A volatile mixture of fear, jealousy, and 
frustrations resulted. Within the communist elite, factions sharpened as China faced 
new policy options and an impending generational change in leadership. Some 
leaders wanted to reform the communist system and others took advantage of the 
situation to carve up the economy into gigantic family fiefs.5 Some leaders disa-
greed with these changes and wanted to revive classic Stalinist forms. The existing 
communist institutions of political and economic control seemed inadequate and 
anachronistic in the face of all these changes. When massive demonstrations broke 
out, many Chinese participants and foreign observers thought that violence would 
be so costly to both sides that some peaceful resolution would be found. However, 
the rigid, autocratic political institutions of Chinese communism were unable to 
adapt to these new challenges. Successful negotiations were not possible between 
48 
Conflict Quarterly 
the divided and frightened elite and the semi-chaotic demonstrators. Ultimately the 
elite could agree only on violent repression to re-assert its power. 
ORIGINS, ESCALATION, AND RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT 
Before looking at the Chinese case, it is appropriate to review theoretical 
perspectives concerning the origin of political conflict and the factors which 
influence peaceful or violent outcomes. Political conflicts are inherent in all 
differentiated and dynamic (that is to say in all) societies. People and groups have 
different interests and values. When they try to change (or stabilize) the distribution 
of political, economic, and social values to their own advantage, conflict is likely. 
Modernization changes the distribution of social resources and the notions of 
fairness, leading to constantly renewed tensions. Economic development may offer 
new wealth to ameliorate conflicts but it also brings further differentiation and 
tensions. Political development often brings an expansion of state power; different 
people, groups, and regions often are drawn into conflict to utilize state power for 
their own benefit and to protect themselves from others using state power in a 
manner contrary to their interests.6 Changes at the international level affect the 
resources and values of various domestic groups.7 
Once an atmosphere of conflict exists, the initiation of violence is very 
simple. The process may start accidentally by a minor random incident, such as a 
cow trampling a neighboring village's crops, a thoughtless act of vandalism, or an 
overly energetic police response to a minor problem. Spectators can join an 
incipient conflict, enlarging it.8 Alternatively, violence may be deliberate. One 
party to a dispute may gauge that the benefits of threatening or actually using 
violence exceed the costs. A side may try to bully the other side into retreating in 
the face of its dominant power and willingness to attack. As children playing 
"chicken" and secretaries of state practising "brinkmanship," a side may commit 
itself to violence, hoping the other side will be sensible enough to back down.9 
Whether violence started by accident or choice, it can escalate easily. 
Conflict often undermines moderate leaders and strengthens contentious leaders, 
leading to a mutually reinforcing process of further escalation. Tensions are further 
sharpened as parties to a dispute make more commitments to justify investments 
already made to the struggle. They all think that one more threat or one more attack 
will cause their opponents to collapse.10 Through such strategies and iterative 
processes, minor incidents can generate extravagant investments and become more 
difficult to resolve peacefully. 
Given such tendencies towards violence, how is peaceful cooperation 
possible? Parties to a dispute normally have many objectives, some of which are 
at least partially compatible. Thomas Hobbes sensed this when he argued that 
people would accept the power of the leviathan to avoid the horrors of a state of 
nature. One classic model of conflict that highlights the shared interests in 
cooperation is the "prisoner's dilemma," in which two prisoners are offered 
leniency if they confess and give evidence against each other but are threatened with 
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severe punishment if they refuse to cooperate with the police. They can minimize 
their joint punishment if they can agree to remain silent. Another model, the 
tragedy of the commons, shows how cooperation is needed to provide long-term 
benefits for all." 
The key question, then, is under what circumstances the mutual benefits of 
a peaceful solution can be reached. Sometimes after a protracted period of struggle, 
two sides may recognize they are "relatively equal in power" and they may fall into 
a stalemate, after which inaction and delay, yielding, withdrawing, and problem-
solving provides various possible paths for de-escalation and peaceful resolution. 
An agreement generally requires an opportunity to interact and an environment of 
mutual trust arising from previous interactions so that promises about future 
behavior are meaningful. 
However, several factors can lead away from peace. If one party to a dispute 
thinks it has enough power to force the other side to yield but the other side feels it 
has sufficient power to establish a stalemate, a violent showdown is likely. Such a 
situation is not uncommon because political actors often overestimate their ability 
to control others and underestimate the costs of the inability to do so.12 In an era of 
rapid change, when the actual power of the various groups is changing and when 
political actors are eager to change (or maintain) the balance of power, hope and 
fantasy can lead to misperception, miscalculation, and violence.13 
A situation is particularly precarious if one or both sides see a conflict as 
affecting the relative power of the sides for future conflicts. A powerful side may 
use excessive force to weaken an opponent in the future; conversely, an opposition 
movement may judge that expanded conflict will weaken the long-term viability of 
a regime. When parties to a dispute are more interested in changing the relative 
distribution of power than in the absolute benefits and costs of a conflict, cooperation 
is more difficult.14 A closely related, tragic situation occurs when one side has a 
martyr complex and believes that its demise will weaken the legitimacy of the 
victors and will inspire others to enter the struggle in the future. In this logic, the 
more horrible the loss, the greater the victory. 
Potentially avoidable violence can also break out when a party to a dispute 
is involved in several conflicts simultaneously and a sensible policy in one conflict 
brings an unfortunate outcome in another. For example, wise domestic policy can 
result in apparently foolish foreign policies or vice versa.15 
Even when peaceful conflict resolution is mutually beneficial and therefore 
possible in principle, it is frequently elusive. Third party mediation sometimes 
plays a critical role in facilitating discussions, improving perceptions, and helping 
two sides to reach a mutually beneficial compromise. Experts in conflict resolution 
observe, "In general, one cannot expect the participants to give a full and fair picture 
of the situation, for they are more likely to emphasize their own concerns and views. 
Thus a third party is necessary."16 
This review of theory of conflict resolution has emphasized a "two actor" 
model which presumes two unitary, rational actors. Such a model is both simple and 
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illuminating but also obscures a very important dimension of conflict, namely the 
fact that each "actor" is a coalition or amalgamation of people, interests, and social 
forces. In conflict situations, centrifugal forces within the coalitions can both 
undermine the ability of each coalition to act in a unitary, rational manner and can 
also create opportunities for coalitions to change and adopt new negotiating 
positions to reach some agreement. 
If one of the actors is a crowd, the dynamics of crowd behavior must be 
considered. Generally speaking, most people will avoid political demonstrations 
because the personal risk is too great compared to the potential benefits. " However, 
if a regime fails to mobilize coercive forces (because of elite conflict or indecision) 
and people feel it is relatively safe to come out on the streets, crowds can grow 
rapidly and reach a point where they present a profound challenge to a regime. A 
leader may have to choose between surrender, flight, or bloody suppression. 
Huntington's hypothesis is that a critical element in the outcome of conflict 
is the nature of political institutions. The challenge of identifying the areas of shared 
interests; of bargaining creatively; of establishing trust to make and keep agreements; 
of forming, maintaining, and/or changing coalitions that are parties to negotiations 
— these are precisely the challenges of establishing political institutions to which 
Huntington referred. However, establishing institutions is itself a highly political 
process. Political actors fight to influence the structure and rules of emergent 
institutions to their own benefit. 
China in the spring of 1989 illustrates the enormous difficulty of developing 
institutions that can prevent a tragic escalation to violence. Even though many 
participants and observers thought a peaceful settlement was possible, political 
institutions were unable to bridge the clash of interests between the demonstrators 
and the state; nor could they facilitate a transformation of the coalitions into some 
new political environment. 
CLASH OF INTERESTS BETWEEN TWO ACTORS 
At its most simplistic level, the Tiananmen Square crisis was a two-actor 
conflict, a challenge by student demonstrators directed at the communist elite. The 
initial demands of student leaders were simply to participate in the funeral of Hu 
Yaobang, the former General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, who died 
on 15 April 1989. However, this trivial request was packaged with a wide range of 
political, procedural, and symbolic demands that China's communist leaders 
refused to accept. Students wanted to organize student associations that were 
independent from the communist party or the government. (This demand had been 
raised during student demonstrations in December 1986.'8) Student leaders also 
wanted recognition of status equal to members of the standing committee of the 
political bureau of the Chinese Communist Party. Indeed they hinted that they had 
a higher degree of legitimacy than communist leaders because they had been 
elected. '9 China's communist leaders could not imagine students as their equals and 
could not tolerate a student organization autonomous from the Communist Party's 
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leadership because factory workers would demand the same right. Such a prospect 
undoubtedly reminded them of how an autonomous organization of factory workers 
in Poland eventually rose to challenge the communist system. Students presented 
a wide range of demands for broad political and educational reform, and for far 
reaching controls against corruption. Finally, students demanded that the commu-
nist leadership retract its editorial of 26 April that had characterized student 
demonstrations as chaos, sabotage, and conspiracy. The communist leaders refused 
to admit error or to legitimate student protest activities. Facing this multifaceted 
barrage of demands, the communist leadership could not move quickly to defuse the 
situation. Tensions escalated instead. 
Neither side felt that the time was ripe for negotiating these difficult issues. 
With demonstrations growing to vast proportions over a few weeks,20 student 
leaders wanted to maintain the momentum of the demonstrations and expand them 
further before negotiating. They moved boldly with a hunger strike on 13 May. 
Given students' negligible nutritional reserves, this threatened martyrdom. Two 
days later rumors spread that eleven students threatened self-immolation.21 The threat 
of student death hung over the crisis, adding tension and urgency. Public support for 
students swelled. 
Party and government officials were also wary of negotiations. They 
supposed that slow paced negotiations with the demonstrators would legitimate 
opposition and enable the protest movement to increase its relative power. They 
wanted to move quickly to break the momentum of the protest movement before it 
created broader social and economic dislocation and before it could be converted 
into a disciplined, effective organization. They especially wanted to clear Tiananmen 
Square before the scheduled visit of Mikhail Gorbachev on 15-18 May which would 
symbolize a new relationship with the Soviet Union and fill China's capital with the 
international press. During these weeks, the leadership instinctively fell back on its 
traditional techniques: cooptation and political repression. As demonstrations 
intensified, the leadership began preparations for their harsher methods: police and 
"goon squads" (workers armed with sticks and pipes). The leadership also 
considered martial law, a new tactic of political control utilized just two months 
earlier in Lhasa Tibet to suppress nationalistic riots and demonstrations. 
The senior communist leadership treated Gorbachev's visit to China as a 
deadline. After over a million people demonstrated peacefully in Tiananmen 
Square and on the adjacent Avenue of Perpetual Peace in full view of international 
journalists, a majority vote of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau 
ordered martial law. Military forces began to converge on Beijing. This created a 
new time factor in the situation. Troops could not be kept assembled indefinitely. 
If they were not used, they had to be demobilized in a manner than would imply the 
original mobilization was a hollow threat. If discipline in troops faltered, the power 
base of the ruling elite could erode. Moreover, once troops were brought in, any 
incident created by anger or misunderstanding by students, hoodlums, undisciplined 
troops, or provocateurs on either side could ignite a conflagration. In short, the 
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commitment of troops added a new and urgent but unspecified deadline to the 
circumstances. 
Demonstrators, however, ignored the new threats and instead commenced a 
remarkable campaign of civil disobedience to immobilize military forces brought 
to Beijing. Grandmothers sat down in front of military trucks, bus drivers parked 
their buses to create barricades, and workers found bricks, sewer pipes, and concrete 
to block streets. Citizens sabotaged military vehicles by deflating tires, cutting 
wires, and draining fuel tanks. These actions began to erode military discipline and 
unity. Rumors spread of a general strike.22 Demonstrations erupted in cities 
throughout the country. 
These events further intensified the pressure of time. The political bureau 
held an enlarged meeting on 22-24 May to consolidate support for the hard-line 
approach.23 Yang Shangkun, President of China and Executive Vice Chairman of 
the Central Military Commission, warned that Beijing was "out of control" and that 
communist rule was on the verge of collapse.24 At the same time, student dem-
onstrators, further emboldened by popular support and the apparent split in the 
military, were undeterred by threats. They continued efforts to mobilize more 
support. They erected the Goddess of Democracy statue, established links with the 
Autonomous Workers Union, and hinted at extremist actions such as blocking 
railroad stations.25 Four intellectuals started a new hunger strike on 2 June to keep 
up the momentum.26 
The students were no longer the hard-liners' main problem. The 
entire population of Beijing was seemingly united in effective 
resistance against the hard-liners' refusal to negotiate with students, 
and broad sectors of party and government were in open defiance. 
Outside the capital, demonstrations had occurred in more than 
80 cities.27 
There were wild and conflicting rumors: some military leaders were planning a 
mutiny to force Li Peng to resign.28 Deng was hospitalized with prostate cancer and 
perhaps dead; power was placed in the hands of President Yang Shangkun to handle 
the student unrest.29 
Under these conditions, the time was still not ripe for either side to bargain. 
Both sides thought they would be in a stronger relative position in the future. 
Demonstrators thought they could expand further their strength. Communist 
leaders urgently had to reestablish control over Beijing, reverse the dissipation of 
governmental authority throughout the country, and reestablish unity in the elite and 
military before they could "negotiate." 
Certain cultural values also hampered a peaceful agreement.30 Chinese 
culture fully understands negotiations and the value of "saving face" in reaching 
agreements. At the same time, Chinese political culture also recognizes that 
political violence plays an important role in defining the end of political struggle and 
the beginning of enforced stability.31 From this perspective, the Tiananmen mas-
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sacre was analogous to the repression of Chinese reformers at the turn of the century 
and the Shanghai massacre of communist activists in 1927 by Chiang Kai-shek. 
Another dimension of the conflict in spring 1989 was that it took the form of 
a family argument that was not amenable to normal political negotiations. The 
political leaders were struggling to maintain patriarchal power and treated the 
demonstrators as disobedient children. In discussions with his elderly friends, Deng 
referred to them as "little babies," and Li Peng said in a meeting with students, "We 
look at you as if you were our own children."32 This paternalism inflamed students 
who wanted to be treated as adults. "We are not only juniors [sons and younger 
brothers] but also citizens. The government must be the government of citizens, not 
the government of children. When it is conducting a dialogue with students, it must 
not take a patriarchal attitude."33 Psychological tensions deeply rooted in family 
relationships were writ large on the national political scene. Under these conditions, 
government attempts at "dialogue" were perceived by students as paternal orders to 
cease demonstrations without a political quid pro quo. Both sides used the dialogues 
for political and emotional posturing. Students were intent on "dividing the 
household" and setting up their own households. 
Only a very vigorous, skilled intervention by a third party mediator might 
have headed off a violent confrontation. China had no such party because the 
communists had been so successful in eliminating independent domestic organi-
zations. Nor was any foreign or international intermediary organization able to 
help. China's fears of foreign involvement in domestic affairs were too great to 
allow this. 
The most successful third party efforts at mediation were done by the 
Chinese Red Cross and medical personnel, but their accomplishments were modest. 
When the hunger strike began on 13 May the Beijing Branch of the Chinese Red 
Cross began work to assure the medical safety of the students. Student leaders were 
wary, but after three days of discussion they signed an agreement allowing the 
Beijing Branch to conduct rescue work and to examine and treat weak students. As 
the hunger strike proceeded, the Red Cross took 3,504 students to the hospital for 
treatment.34 In the final denouement in the pre-dawn hours of 4 June two doctors 
from the Chinese Red Cross helped negotiate the peaceful withdrawal of suicide-
ready students from massacre-ready troops.35 
Analyzing the conflict as a two actor model underscores the inherent distance 
of positions between the elite and the demonstrators and the difficulty in reaching 
resolution. There were no political institutions that bridged the gap between 
communist leaders and demonstrators. Ad-hoc efforts to arrange meetings and 
consultations inflamed the situation and could not solve it. 
DIVISIONS IN THE ELITE 
This summary of events raises certain questions. Why were the political 
coalitions that constituted the two sides unable to move towards each other? Why 
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did hard-liners dominate on both sides and prevent more flexible people from 
finding a settlement? To some extent this dynamic is common during the escalation 
of conflict. In China the lack of political institutions both in the elite and among the 
demonstrators further inhibited such a development. 
A critical aspect of the crisis was the fact that China's leadership was deeply 
factionalized by an internal power struggle. To a large extent, the violent repression 
of the demonstrators was an outgrowth of the intra-party struggle between reform-
minded leader Zhao Ziyang, who sought support from extra-party social forces, and 
party conservatives, who feared that communist rule was being destabilized. 
China's elite could be considered to have three major groupings, but each 
grouping to some extent reflected alliances of subgroups. A reform faction had 
urged deep structural changes in China's highly centralized political economy. 
Some reformers stressed market reforms, but others wanted more powers shifted to 
provincial and local officials. They argued that some political reforms were 
necessary to enable market reforms to work, to improve governmental efficiency, 
and to strengthen political legitimacy. The conservative faction resisted such 
reforms; some stressed maintaining the highly centralized command economy 
while others emphasized cultural issues. Centrists wanted gradual economic 
reforms but felt that authoritarian political controls were necessary to stabilize the 
political and social order. 
Struggle between reformers and conservatives in the elite sharpened in the 
late 1980s along policy and personnel issues. In agriculture and industry, reformers 
experimented with market mechanisms, but conservatives resisted.36 This debate 
intertwined with succession politics. In the early 1980s, paramount leader Deng 
Xiaoping installed as apparent successors Hu Yaobang as General Secretary of the 
party and Zhao Ziyang as Premier of the government. Both supported vigorous 
reform. Some elderly conservatives grew more restive and forced Hu to resign 
in January 1987 after nationwide student demonstrations.37 Li Peng became 
the Premier and represented conservative interests in both policy debate and 
succession politics. 
Zhao Ziyang and the reformers again got control of the party in fall 1987 and 
began to implement deeper economic reforms; side effects included inflation, fear 
of unemployment and instability, and jealousies about new private wealth and 
corruption. Political reforms started to separate the party from the government and 
to professionalize the civil service in ways that undermined party power.38 The 
confluence of economic and political reforms was very destabilizing. Student 
demonstrations broke out in Beijing in summer 1988 and Zhao reportedly proposed 
that a special military unit be established directly under his office to maintain 
domestic order.39 The script for the 1989 Tiananmen Square tragedy was written a 
year earlier. 
Reacting to the disorder of the summer of 1988, conservatives took the 
offensive on both policy and personnel matters, slowed down economic reforms, 
stopped political reforms,40 and tried to reduce the political power of the reformers.41 
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When students resumed demonstrations in spring 1989, both conservatives and 
reformers tried to take advantage of the situation. On 24 April Li Ximing, 
conservative secretary of the Beijing party committee, put together a report citing 
(or fabricating) the most radical, anti-party student posters and arguing that China 
faced an anti-socialist conspiracy. The political bureau met and endorsed the report 
while Zhao Ziyang was absent visiting North Korea. The next day Deng accepted 
this interpretation and secretly gave instructions for a major editorial in People's 
Daily on 26 April to label student demonstrations as "turmoil," outside the range of 
negotiable behavior. Illegal demonstrations and parades as well as other student 
political activities were forbidden. Deng ordered troops closer to Beijing and 
decided to use military force against demonstrators after Gorbachev's scheduled 
visit in May. 
Despite Deng's decisions, the leadership remained divided. When students 
threatened to demonstrate on 27 April, Deng's long-time friend Yan Mingfu, head 
of the United Front Department, urged restraint. A compromise was worked out at 
the highest level that troops would be present but would not use force.42 This 
ambiguous response sent signals of a deeply divided elite; it gave students the 
impression that they had a green (or at least yellow) light to continue demonstrating 
and that demonstrations might strengthen the reform faction in the leadership. 
Polarization among the top leaders sharpened and became more public as 
demonstrations continued. Party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang took a concilia-
tory approach to students in his speech on 4 May calling for a solution "according 
to the rule of democracy and law and in an atmosphere of reason and order."43 The 
next day Li Peng said Zhao's speech was a personal opinion, not the official party 
position. For the next week, Zhao and Li projected different perspectives. Finally, 
on 17 May Zhao told Gorbachev that Deng was still China's paramount leader, 
implying openly that China's leadership was divided and that China's crisis could 
not be solved until Deng stepped down. These political divisions were mirrored in 
the army. Some officers announced that they would refuse to suppress students, that 
they supported Zhao, and that they endorsed reforms in the military.44 Incipient 
divisions in the military certainly heightened fears of instability. The Standing 
Committee of the Party's Political Bureau met the next day and voted three to two 
for a hard line. Zhao was ousted. He visited students in the square, tears in his eyes, 
implicitly acknowledging in public that he had lost the inner party struggle and then 
disappeared from view. 
The overturn of the party's general secretary sparked more high level intra-
party conflict. At a critical meeting of the enlarged political bureau on 22-24 May 
Zhao's supporters made a strong bid for power. Conservatives charged that the 
conciliatory approach of reformers was in fact spurring students to demonstrate 
more vigorously. Conservatives implied that factionalism and reaching outside the 
party to society were violations of party discipline.45 Fearing that continued ex-
pansion of demonstrations would undermine party rule, a majority of party leaders 




In planning the military operation, great care was taken to avoid a lapse of 
military discipline or a battle between troops supporting different factions. The 
Beijing troops, sympathetic to demonstrations by the Beijing residents, were pulled 
back and the Minister of Defense (who historically was close to these troops) was 
put under house arrest. Troops from the provinces, under the command of the half-
brother of President Yang Shang-kun, were ordered to evict the demonstrators. 
Rumors circulated of tense standoffs and armed incidents between troops, but 
ultimately party leadership and military discipline were maintained. The conservative 
group of the party consolidated control over both the military and the party. 
For party leaders the intra-party struggle became linked to the demonstrators 
in a complex "nested game." Party reformers sought allies with demonstrators 
while conservatives used demonstrations to justify their bid for expanded power. 
China's weak institutions were not able to convert this complex political situation 
with multiple conflicts and incipient alliances into a new political status quo. 
DISORGANIZED OPPOSITION 
Just as the intra-party struggle made it difficult for the elite to negotiate as a 
unitary rational actor, so too the lack of organization among the demonstrators 
contributed to the failure to find a peaceful solution. The demonstrators were 
comprised of a movement of four amorphous groups—students, reform intellectuals, 
workers, and general citizens. These groups could not form a unified, disciplined 
organization that could act in a coherent fashion. This was inevitable, given the fact 
that under China's communist dictatorship independent political organizing had 
been virtually illegal for decades. 
Students 
Chinese students have a long history of demonstrating for political change. 
Seventy years earlier student demonstrations on 4 May 1919 triggered China's 
revolutionary process. In recent years, as they absorbed Western ideas of democracy 
and observed vigorous student demonstrations in other countries, they maintained 
their traditional political activism. They demonstrated in fall 1985 against Japanese 
influence. A nationwide wave of demonstrations for democracy and human rights 
swept China in December 1986.46 Beijing students also marched and sat-in at 
Tiananmen Square during April and June 1988, triggering a conservative response. 
Demonstrating had become part of student culture, so as conservative power waxed 
in early 1989, and as economic problems and corruption continued, students 
instinctively began to meet, organize, and wait for the spark that would justify 
demonstrations. The seventieth anniversary of the 4 May movement, was the 
original target date, but the death of Hu Yaobang on 15 April provided an 
unexpected earlier catalyst. They demanded a role in his funeral and dialogue with 
state and party leaders about democratic reforms. 
Students rapidly organized the logistics for the demonstrations and provided . 
marshals to ensure non-violent behavior.47 They got thousands of students to come 
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from other cities to join the Beijing events. These students stayed a few days and 
nights in Tiananmen Square and took news and ideas of student organization back 
home, where local demonstrations followed. Telephone and fax facilitated national 
and international coordination. When sanitary conditions deteriorated in the 
square, supporters in Hong Kong sent tents and Chinese students in the United 
States airlifted plastic garbage bags. The Beijing student organization developed 
quickly the capability to manage the logistical problems of huge demonstrations 
continuing for weeks. 
The students were less successful in developing the capacity to reach clear 
political decisions, negotiate effectively, and discipline participants. As the 
Tiananmen Square crisis evolved, student organizations proliferated. They included 
the "Dialogue Committee," the "Hunger Strike Committee," and the "Committee 
to Defend Tiananmen Square." Each committee had its own leaders and procedural 
rules, some of which were so democratic that decisions could be vetoed easily by 
a few dissenters. No student leader could control events. When student leaders tried 
to lower tensions, they were accused of yielding to government pressure.48 Leaders 
of student groups changed as the process unfolded. On 15 May some students 
demonstrating in the Tiananmen Square agreed to move to the eastern side of the 
square so that ceremonies for Gorbachev could take place without incident. 
However, a small group of students refused to move, and other students drifted 
back.49 Even when the Beijing students responded to the suggestions of their 
leaders, out-of-town demonstrators kept coming and stayed until they were fatigued 
and out of money. As they left, more arrived. 
In a critical meeting with Li Peng and other top officials on 18 May these 
factors weighed heavily. Student leader Wu'er Kaixi pointed out that hunger 
strikers had adopted the principle of unanimous decision-making. "If one student 
refuses to leave and continues the hunger strike, it will be extremely difficult for us 
to guarantee that the others will go." Yan Mingfu reacted, "...the three independent 
student organizations have less and less ability to control the situation..."50 
The leadership disarray was symbolized by the final departure of about 3,000 
students from the southern part of the Tiananmen Square early on 4 June after 
extensive bloodshed on the Avenue of Heavenly Peace and the northern side of 
the square. Not until speeches, debates, and voting took place did the group 
evacuate safely.51 
Reform Intellectuals 
Some intellectuals with important party or official academic positions 
mobilized against conservative party leaders in early 1989 and a few eventually 
became closely associated with the opposition movement.52 The public involve-
ment of intellectuals started when the charismatic astrophysicist Fang Lizhi sent a 
public letter to Deng Xiaoping on 6 January 1989, appealing for the release of 
political prisoners to celebrate the fortieth anniversary of the communist revolution 
and the seventieth anniversary of the 4 May 1919 movement. During the spring 
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dozens of Chinese intellectuals petitioned the National People's Congress along the 
same lines. Over 500 Chinese living in the United States also joined.53 
Links developed between student leaders and reform intellectuals. Just a day 
after Hu Yaobang's death, a staff member of the State Structural Reform Research 
Office reportedly contacted Wang Dan, a student leader at Beijing University, to 
urge student demonstrations. Li Shuxian (Fang Lizhi' s wife) reportedly continued 
such discussions two days later. A petition issued by Yan Jiaqi, former Director of 
the Institute of Political Science, on 21 April supported student demands concerning 
Hu's funeral.54 Discussions continued and on 4 May a group of intellectuals 
expressed public support for the student movement in Beijing. A few days after 
students began their hunger strike, Yan and other intellectuals issued declarations 
of support.55 On 18 May some of these intellectuals offered to hold their own hunger 
strike in sympathy with the students, or to give students a chance to break their 
strike. Eventually intellectuals in Beijing and Shanghai formed loose organizations 
to support students.56 
Young Workers 
Young workers, including employed, self-employed, and unemployed, 
were another important element in the opposition. In the late 1970s, the previous 
system of assigned permanent jobs for high school graduates was replaced by a 
fairly open labor market for young people. In addition, large numbers of rural 
residents came to the cities to work as construction laborers, peddlers, maids, etc., 
especially in the late winter, after the Chinese new year festival and before spring 
planting. By the late 1980s, China's cities had a "floating population" estimated at 
50 million. In the major cities of Shanghai, Beijing, and Guangzhou the floating 
population exceeded a million and constituted 20-33 percent of the population.57 
These young and migrant workers were not dependent on, and therefore not 
controlled by, the party-dominated work units and neighborhood committees that 
regulated the lives of other urban residents. The volatility of this population was 
revealed the previous year in a riot sparked by a disputed call in a soccer game in 
Sichuan. Fans rioted for 12 hours, looted, and tried to burn a police station. At least 
five were sent off to labor camp for "reeducation."58 Similarly, there had been a riot 
in Beijing in 1985 following a soccer game with a team from Hong Kong. 
As student demonstrations began in spring 1989, a number of young workers 
joined. Some served as body guards to student leaders and stayed at student 
dormitories. Non-student organizations proliferated during the demonstrations, 
such as the "Beijing Citizens Dare-to-Die Corps" and the "Special Picket at 
Tiananmen Square."59 Peddlers gave food and beverages to the students. Motor-
cyclists, sporting names such as "Flying Tiger Team" or "Iron Riding Guard Team" 
carried messages and reported troop movements around the city.60 In the aftermath 
of the violence of 4 June many workers and unemployed workers were arrested and 




The final group in the demonstration included older factory workers with 
permanent positions, civil servants, and members of the general population of 
Beijing, including home makers and grandmothers. They were motivated by 
inflation and corruption. Inflation was a gnawing problem throughout the 1980s as 
the government printed money for wage increases and construction projects. 
Standards of living deteriorated for many. When Chinese leaders decided to raise 
non-staple food prices by 25-50 percent in May 1988 to reduce government budget 
subsidies, there was widespread suffering and resentment among the urban popu-
lation. This situation continued into spring 1989.62 
The sense of pervasive government corruption made things worse. As 
market prices rose, officials kept some goods to allocate at low prices to friends and 
relatives, who could resell goods at huge profits. Rumors were widespread that 
children of high officials were given jobs with vast opportunities for graft. Some 
entrepreneurs were also making large profits. Profiteering while many were 
suffering from inflation created widespread anger. These frustrations inflamed the 
decades of pent up anger stemming from control and manipulation of life by party 
autocrats.63 The students responded to these concerns and demanded that officials 
publish lists of income and bank holdings. 
Reform of the industrial structure also sparked serious tension. Restructur-
ing industrial enterprises created fears of unemployment among workers who took 
job stability for granted. The policy of letting enterprise managers determine 
work rules, rewards, and punishments often led to sharp conflicts in the work-
place as workers tried to protect their established rights. In addition, contro-
versial plans were afoot to convert urban housing from very low rents to higher 
mortgage payments. 
For these reasons, the general population joined demonstrations to some 
extent on 27 April and to a greater extent on 17-18 May after the student hunger 
strike had been in effect for a week. After martial law was declared housewives and 
workers peacefully blocked and immobilized military forces to prevent attacks on 
students. The Beijing Autonomous Federation of Trade Unions and an Independent 
Workers Association were created in the final phase of the demonstrations, inspired 
by Poland's Solidarity union movement and by the Chinese students. When three 
union organizers were arrested, hundreds of students and workers demonstrated.64 
However, this mass discontent, mobilization, and collective action did not constitute 
mass organization. In contrast to the situation in Eastern Europe, these Chinese 
organizations "were more a result of the upheaval than a cause."65 
WEAK INSTITUTIONS 
Faced with this crisis, China's political institutions were unable to provide 
an effective framework for conflict resolution. The most critical institutional gap 
was a mechanism for linking popular political participation with state decision-
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making. In theory, the National People's Congress provided these links and had the 
constitutional right to decide the issue of martial law; but party leaders prevented 
it from meeting during the crisis. Indeed, those who petitioned for a meeting were 
criticized and the chairman of its standing committee, Wan Li, was informally 
detained for a few days. 
The key decisions throughout the crisis were made at closed meetings by a 
handful of party leaders under the influence of senior leader Deng Xiaoping. The 
party's political bureau made the first major decision on 25 April; it issued the 26 
April editorial criticizing student demonstrations and began moving troops to 
Beijing. Deng himself played a major role in this decision that sparked massive 
demonstrations and escalated the whole situation. The determination that the 
Gorbachev visit constituted a deadline for termination of demonstrations or use of 
military force, apparently was made by Deng but was never publicized. The 
decision to adopt martial law was taken by the five-member standing committee of 
the political bureau. This decision was explained to an expanded political bureau 
meeting, involving perhaps a few hundred participants. These meetings were held 
secretly and their deliberations were not reported publicly. 
This style of decision-making was not conducive to effective negotiation 
between the regime and the demonstrators. It provided no institutionalized methods 
for interest articulation and aggregation. It gave students no opportunity to share 
in decision-making and to assume responsibility for implementing agreements. It 
failed to provide an environment in which each side could gradually modify its 
position to reach an agreement. It was unable to convert a zero-sum struggle for 
relative power between party leaders and the demonstrators into a new system with 
stronger political institutions which could provide absolute gains to both party 
leaders and students. 
Huntington points out that historically, "The principal institutional means for 
organizing the expansion of political participation are political parties and the party 
system."66 The Chinese communist political system not only failed to provide this; 
it deliberately prevented it. Dominated by a single political party, it was an elaborate 
structure set up to rule, to change society, and to prevent effective, institutionalized 
political participation and an organized opposition. It specifically rejected the 
notion of a system based on competitive political parties which could peacefully 
translate social and political consciousness and demands into institutionalized 
political action. Students, workers, and other citizens had no alternative mechanisms 
to organize effectively, negotiate rationally, and seek objectives peacefully. 
CONCLUSIONS 
China's spring of 1989 was a tragic example of failure to resolve a conflict 
peacefully. The costs to all concerned were very high. Hundreds and thousands 
were killed and maimed. The "successful" leaders and the state system lost 
legitimacy by using violence on unarmed, peaceful citizens. The outcome was 
especially tragic because it seemed avoidable. The demonstrations were triggered 
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by an effort to honor the memory of the deceased former leader of the Chinese 
Communist Party. The General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party when 
the protests began was sympathetic to the students, supported economic and 
political reforms, and endorsed student complaints against corruption. Soon after 
the first demonstrations there were informal meetings between student leaders and 
high officials as well as high level party meetings in an effort to avoid violence. 
Many Chinese analysts were optimistic that a peaceful resolution was possible. 
Under such favorable conditions, the inability to reach a peaceful solution under-
scores the complexity of such situations. 
In a broad sense the violence reflected the stress of communist reform and 
socio-economic change. At a less abstract level of analysis, three factors complicated 
the search for a peaceful resolution. First, the actual issues concerning the autonomy 
of students from party control were difficult to resolve and the time was never ripe 
for serious negotiations. Second, the elite was involved simultaneously in an intra-
party struggle and in dealing with the demonstrators. Divided between efforts to co-
opt and repress demonstrators, it was unable to send out clear signals about its intent. 
One faction was more than willing to use violence to consolidate its alliances with 
military forces and to eradicate its opposition. Finally, the demonstrators were 
divided and unable to act in a disciplined manner. 
It should be noted that these three factors reinforced each other. Demonstra-
tors surged with hopes of influencing the elite power struggle. Conversely, the elite 
divided to some extent when it saw the mass demonstrations. Citizens kept 
demonstrating because students adopted sympathetic positions. As more citizens 
kept demonstrating, students felt it was premature to negotiate. When some military 
leaders and units sympathized with the students, the sceptre of civil war emerged 
and conservative leaders panicked. 
Chinese political institutions provided no effective environment in which to 
resolve these issues peacefully. Governmental decisions were made secretly by a 
handful of people. People had no chance to express their concerns by voting for a 
competing political party. There was no opportunity for institutionalized bargaining. 
Violence was used instead. This pattern has characterized Chinese history for the 
past century. Chinese leaders who tried to reform the old imperial system in 1898 
were executed. During the 1920s to the 1940s both the Nationalist and the 
Communist Parties used violence. After the communists came to power in 1949, 
violence was used many times, including during the period of land reform (1949-
51), the anti-rightist movement (1957), and the cultural revolution (1966-76). 
Protest demonstrations were suppressed at Tiananmen Square and at Democracy 
Wall in 1976, 1979, and 1987. 
The inability to find a peaceful solution is not unique to China. One scholar 
concluded on the basis of 434 conflict episodes: "One of the most striking aspects 
of the findings is the tendency of regimes to employ interventions that exacerbate 
political conflict rather than regulate it effectively."67 Peaceful settlements may be 
more unusual than the violent ones. 
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From this point of view the peaceful overthrow of communist governments 
in Eastern Europe in the months after the Tiananmen events is exceptional. In 
Eastern Europe the elite was more dependent on external military support (from the 
Soviet Union) and lacked its own legitimacy; when Soviet support was withdrawn, 
it dissolved. Second, the Eastern European opposition movements developed 
broader, more disciplined organizations. They had deeper historical roots and in 
some countries had support from the Catholic church. An additional factor was that 
the Chinese crisis came first, so all parties, both in the elite and among the 
demonstrators, were more aware of the risks and costs of violence. 
Many factors affect whether the outcome of a conflict will be peaceful or 
violent. It is premature to suggest that the identical configuration of factors that led 
to violence in China is fully applicable to many other violent conflagrations in the 
Third World. Given the myriad idiosyncratic personal and institutional factors, the 
range of choices, the path dependency of the process, and the uncertainty of 
knowledge about all the variables, precise prediction of the outcome of conflict is 
subject to the same constraints as for other "chaotic" systems. Just as a meteorologist 
cannot predict that a thunderstorm will strike at a particular time and place but can 
recognize the preconditions and dynamics of storms and forecast probabilities, 
political scientists can outline the social and environmental factors that make 
violence likely. This article argues that violence can be forecast when there are 
inadequate institutions to manage the stresses of development and to provide a 
setting for rational, peaceful conflict resolution. From a prescriptive perspective, 
this suggests that efforts to resolve incipient violent conflict should emphasize the 
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